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Abstract
In this paper we examine how local content protection (LCP) affects the use of the domestic
intermediates, the use of total intermediates and the domestic welfare when domestic
intermediate−goods market is under monopsony. In the domestic intermediate−goods market
under monopsony, the marginal expenditure cost (MEC) of using domestic intermediates has
a discontinuous segment because the average expenditure cost (AEC) is a kinked curve. It is
shown that there exists a case where because of the discontinuity of the marginal expenditure
cost, LCP has no effect on the use of domestic intermediates and has a negative impact on the
domestic final−goods producer. This paper provides a summary of the general effects of LCP
on the domestic intermediate−goods market under monopsony in terms of resource
allocations and the domestic welfare. Moreover, the effects of LCP under monopsony are
compared with the case under perfect competition and under free trade.
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For the last decades, the foreign direct investment has signiﬁcantly emerged throughout the world.
Some of the host countries imposed numerous restrictions on it to protect domestic industries.
SomeoftheseinvestmentmeasuresviolatetheNationalTreatmentAgreement(ArticleIIIofGATT
1994) or the agreements on the quantitative restrictions (Article XI of GATT 1994). Therefore
they are prohibited by the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement)
which contains statements prohibiting any TRIMs that are inconsistent with the provisions of the
GATT Articles. An example of these restrictions is local content protection (LCP) or local content
requirements, which violates the Article XI of GATT. Local content protection scheme, a widely
spread form of intermediate-goods protection, is used most notably in the automobile industries
of Canada, Australia and Latin America. LCP requires that a given percentage of domestic value-
added (value-added content protection; VACP) or domestic components (physical content protec-
tion; PCP) be embodied in the speciﬁed ﬁnal goods1. In the ﬁeld of the free trade agreements
(FTAs), the rules of origins (ROOs) have quite similar structures because the determination of the
origin of the goods is often assessed by the content rate embodied in the production process and
its eects can be often considered as LCP2.
After some early analyses, Grossman (1981) developed a partial equilibrium model of a com-
petitive ﬁrm that is subjected to LCP scheme and demonstrated the resource allocation eects of
the two main types of the protection (PCP and VACP). He also considered how the analysis could
be altered when the market of domestic intermediates is under monopoly. A number of papers have
followed Grossman and extended the LCP scheme under several imperfectly competitive market
structures. Monopoly in the market of intermediates was introduced by Mussa (1993), Vousden
(1987), Beghin and Sumner (1992) and Hollander (1987). LCP in the oligopolistic market struc-
ture was discussed in Krishna and Itoh (1988) and Ishikawa (1999)3. But none of them have dealt
with the eects of LCP under the domestic monopsony except Richardson (1991), despite of the
fact that the large ﬁnal-goods producers can have some monopsonic power and be likely to act
as a monopsonist in the market of intermediates. Richardson (1991) showed the counter-intuitive
eects of LCP on proﬁts with a Cournot duopsony case. But he did not pay so much attentions to
the eects of a monopsonic power on the resource allocations.
The main objective of this paper is to examine the resource allocation eects of LCP on the use
of a domestically produced intermediates and on the domestic welfare in the monopsony market
structure. It is considered that the monopsony arises in the domestic market where the single ﬁnal-
goods producer hires the intermediate factors of input. We are concerned with the case of the
domestic monopsony in the market of intermediates in contrast to the case of perfect competition
and free trade. We also show that, in a certain case, LCP might have no eect on the use of the
domestic intermediates when the government sets LCP slightly higher than the free-trade level.
This possibility arises because of the discontinuous property of the marginal expenditure cost and
it never happens in another market structure.
The next section presents the basic model of LCP under domestic monopsony and shows com-
parisons among the several situations (free trade, perfect competition and domestic monopsony). It
1 Munk (1969) dealt with the case of automobile industry in several Latin American countries and Johnson (1971)
analyzed the case of the Canadian automobile industry before the Canada-US Auto Pact.
2 There are slight dierences between LCP and ROOs.While ROOs require that ﬁnal goods (including imports)
must be originated if they are eligible for zero taris in the member countries, LCP does not require the imports
to meet the content rates.
3 For other literature on LCP and FDI, see Nakanishi and Hara (1997), Lahiri and Ono (1998) and Qiu and Tao
(2001), among others.
1also presents an interesting result of LCP in a certain case. The ﬁnal section concludes the analysis.
2 Monopsony in the intermediate-goods market
We develop a partial equilibrium model consisting of two industries: one producing intermediates,
the other producing a ﬁnal goods using the intermediates and primary labor (labor is assumed to be
internationally immobile). Intermediates can be traded internationally without any transportation
costs, and domestic and imported intermediates are assumed to be perfect substitutes. We analyze
the eect of LCP scheme in the market structure where there is a monopsonist in the market of
domestic intermediates. The domestic industry is assumed to be small in the world market, so
that the world price of imported intermediates and ﬁnal goods are regarded as exogenously given
by domestic producers. We focus on the LCP scheme deﬁned in the physical term (PCP), which
protects domestic intermediate-goods industry by requiring that a certain fraction k [0  k  1]
of the total quantity of physical units of the intermediates embodied in the domestically produced
ﬁnal goods be of domestic origin. The ﬁnal-goods producer is assumed to meet the LCP scheme
and we do not consider the choice between acceptance and rejection of the LCP4.
We describe the technology of the ﬁnal-goods industry as a production function F(L; M +
M), where L is the amount of labor input, and M and M are the quantities of the domestic and
imported intermediates, respectively. For mathematical conveniences, the function F is assumed
to be continuous, twice dierentiable and everywhere strictly concave.
The proﬁt maximization problem for the ﬁnal-goods producer is:
max
L;M;M  = pF(L; M + M
)   qm(M)M   q

mM
   wL; (1)
s.t. M
 = (1   k)(M + M
); (2)
where p is the domestic price of the ﬁnal goods; qm;q
m is domestic and foreign price of the in-
termediates respectively; w is the per-unit labor cost; and qm(M) is the marginal cost function
of domestic intermediate-goods producers and hence the supply function of domestic intermedi-
ates. Since the domestic intermediate-goods producers are assumed to be price-takers, qm(M) is
increasing in M5. Note that the supply function of domestic intermediates is equivalent to the
average expenditure cost (AEC) function for the ﬁnal-goods producer whenever qm is higher than
q
m
6. Since the average expenditure cost of purchasing domestically produced intermediates has an
upward slope, the ﬁnal-goods producer must pay higher price for additional units of domestically
produced intermediates.
4 Grossman (1981) discusses the ﬁnal-goods producer’s acceptance problem of LCP. To avoid a complexity, as in
Vousden (1987), we assume that either (1) the penalty ensures that the producer always choose to fulﬁll the LCP,
or (2) the producer anticipates that violation of the protection would be met by some prohibitive taris.
5 The proﬁt function of the domestic intermediate-goods producers are:
(qm) = qmM  Cm(M); C0
m > 0; C00
m > 0. From the ﬁrst order conditions, qm = C0
m(M).
6 In the standard model of monopsony, the supply curve of the input producer is the average expenditure cost curve
for the buyer. When the average expenditure is upward sloping, then the marginal expenditure has a steeper slope
in general. The equilibrium amount of input is determined by equalizing the marginal value product of input to
the marginal expenditure cost.
2The ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁnal-goods producer’s proﬁt maximization problem are:
pF1 = w; (3)
pF2 = q
0
m(M)M + qm(M)   (1   k); (4)
pF2 = q

m + k; (5)
where the subscript i ofthe function F denotes the partial derivativewith respect to its i th argument
and  is a Lagrangian multiplier. Since  = q0
m(M)M + qm   q
m at equilibrium, the total demand
function for the intermediates (M + M)  Q must satisfy:
pF2 = k[q
0
m(M)M + qm] + (1   k)q

m  q; (6)
where q is deﬁned as the marginal factor cost of total intermediates weighted by k.
The equation (6) addresses important properties. In the ﬁrst bracket [q0
m(M)M +qm] represents
the marginal factor cost of using additional units of domestic intermediates, which is higher than
the price qm because of the domestic monopsonic distortion. We deﬁne the marginal factor cost of
using domestic intermediates as the marginal expenditure cost (MEC) of using domestic intermedi-
ates for the ﬁnal-goods producer. In the last term q
m is the marginal factor cost of using additional
units of imported intermediates which is equal to its price. The ﬁnal-goods producer chooses the
amount of total intermediates Q so that marginal value product of total intermediates equals the
weighted sum of the marginal factor costs of using domestic and imported intermediates. Thus,
the derived demand for total intermediates is deﬁned as a function of q,
Q  M + M
 = Q(p;q;w) =  q(p;q;w): (7)
Accordingly, the derived demand for domestically produced intermediates is
M(p;q;w) = kQ(p;q;w) =  kq(p;q;w); (8)
which, combined with the deﬁnition of q and (6), yields the demand function for domestically
produced intermediates M as a function of qm (not of q). Formally, substituting q with (8), M(qm)


















for domestically produced intermediates M = M(p;qm;w) is exactly the same as the marginal value
product of domestic intermediates. Equilibrium amount of domestically produced intermediates
is determined by equalizing the marginal value product of M to the marginal expenditure cost of
M, while the actual price that the ﬁnal-goods producer must pay for the domestic intermediates is
determined on the average expenditure cost.
Figure 1 shows how the LCP aects the use of intermediates by the ﬁnal-goods producer. To
examine the eects of LCP with monopsony in the domestic intermediate-goods market, we take
following three steps. First, we describe the free-trade equilibrium. Total demand curve of inter-
mediates is given by (7) and described as DD’ line, the supply curve of domestic intermediates is
graphed as SS’ line. In the free-trade equilibrium, given the world price of imported intermediates
q
m, total use of intermediates is determined at point DFT and the use of domestically produced
intermediates is determined at point S FT. Thus, the ﬁnal-goods producer uses MFT units of do-
3mestically produced intermediates and imports (QFT   MFT) units of foreign intermediates. It
should be noted that, with an assumption of a small country, the domestic supply point S FT and
total derived demand point DFT is not changed in the free-trade equilibrium whether the domestic
intermediate-goods market is perfectly competitive or not.
Second, we introduce LCP but assume that competition of domestic intermediate-goods market
remains perfectly competitive. Suppose that the content rate is set by (q
mH=q
mDFT) in the Figure
1. With a content requirement, the derived demand for the domestically produced intermediates
M as a function of q is given by (8) and illustrated as DK line. Any points on the DK line sat-
isfy the k fraction of total use of intermediates. HH’ line also graphs M against price of domestic
intermediates qm which satisﬁes (9). Since the ﬁnal-goods producer behaves competitively in the
domestic intermediate-goods market, the use of domestic intermediates is determined at point I
where HH’ line intersects SS’ line, and the total use of intermediates is determined at point DPC.
Thus, the ﬁnal-goods producer uses MPC units of domestically produced intermediates and im-
ports (QPC   MPC) units of foreign intermediates. Comparing with the free-trade equilibrium,
the use of domestically produced intermediates increases triggered by the LCP. But the domestic
intermediate-goods industry is protected at the expense of the ﬁnal-goods producer. Decreasing
use of the total intermediates implies the shrink of the ﬁnal-goods industry, which was generated
by the increased use of inecient domestic intermediates and the rise in weighted sum of the
marginal factor costs q 7. Geometrically, the welfare loss from the free-trade equilibrium consists
of the loss from the increased use of inecient domestic intermediates (area 4IS FTG) and the loss
from the shrink of the ﬁnal-goods industry (area 4DPCNDFT).
Third, we consider LCP with monopsony in the market of domestic intermediate-goods market.
The average expenditure cost of using domestically produced intermediates for the ﬁnal-goods
producer is illustrated as a kinked line Oq
mS FTS’, which has an upward slope within the range of
qm > q
m. Because of the kinked property of the average expenditure cost, the marginal expenditure
cost of using domestic intermediates, which is graphed as a bold line, has a discontinuous segment
S FTE at M = MFT. The ﬁnal-goods producer chooses the amount of domestic intermediates
M so that the marginal value product of domestic intermediates is equalized with the marginal
expenditure cost of domestic intermediates. The equilibrium amount of domestically produced
intermediates is determined at point A which is the intersection of HH’ line and EE’ line. The
price of the domestic intermediates qm(M) is determined on the average expenditure cost curve at
point C. Total use of the intermediates depends on the weighted sum of marginal factor costs q
which is determined at point B on the DK line. Thus, the total use of intermediates is determined
at point DK. The ﬁnal-goods producer uses MK units of domestically produced intermediates and
imports (QK   MK) units of foreign intermediates.
Comparing with the free-trade equilibrium, an introducing LCP under monopsony in the mar-
ketofdomesticintermediatesresultsinanincreaseintheuseofthedomesticallyproducedinterme-
diates. But the amount of the MK is smaller than that amount under the perfect competition MPC.
This is because the price of the domestic intermediates qm is lowered by the monopsonic pressure
of the ﬁnal-goods producer, therefore the amount of the domestic intermediates is restricted more
than under perfect competition. Moreover, the total use of intermediates under monopsony also
gets smaller than under perfect competition by a decrease in the use of the domestic intermedi-
ates. The more the use of domestic intermediates decreases, the weighted sum of the marginal
factor costs q becomes higher, which implies a decrease in Q. It should be noted that the degree
of shrinkage of the ﬁnal-goods industry is much larger under the monopsony than that under the
7 In the competitive domestic intermediate-goods market, the weighted sum of the marginal factor costs can be
regarded as the average price of the total intermediates, which is deﬁned formally as: q = kqm + (1   k)q
m.
4perfect competition. The welfare cost comparing with the free-trade equilibrium is illustrated as
the sum of the area 4CS FTJ and the area 4DKLDFT, which is larger than under the perfect com-
petition. Comparing with the case under the perfect competition, the damage from a shrink of
the ﬁnal-goods industry under monopsony is enormous, no matter how the ineciency of using
domestic intermediates is lighten by a decrease in M. These comparisons of quantities and welfare
costs are also summarized in Table 1.
Free trade LCP under perfect competition LCP under monopsony
Q QFT QPC QK
M MFT MPC MK
q q
m kqm + (1   k)q
m k[q0






Welfare cost       4IS FTG + 4DPCNDFT 4CS FTJ + 4DKLDFT
Table 1: Comparison of variables and welfare cost in general case
The above analysis in this section leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose the ﬁnal-goods producer behaves as a monopsonist in the market of do-
mestic intermediates. Starting from the free-trade equilibrium, introducing LCP results in an in-
crease in the use of the domestically produced intermediates and a decrease in the total use of
the intermediates in general. The domestic intermediate-goods producers gain from LCP at the
expense of the loss of the ﬁnal-goods producer. The overall eect on welfare is negative.
Finally we consider the special case in the Figure 2 which leads to an interesting result.
Let the content rate evaluated at the free-trade levels of domestic intermediates be deﬁned as
kFT = q
mS FT=q
mDFT. Suppose that the domestic government sets content rate which is slightly
higher than kFT. Then the point H is very close to the free-trade domestic production point S FT.
As we have seen, the marginal expenditure cost has a discontinuous segment under monopsony.
Even if the content rate is slightly higher than kFT, the use of domestic intermediates can not be
expanded from MFT as long as the HH’ line intersects the marginal expenditure cost curve within
the discontinuous segment S FTE. Thus, LCP does not aect the use of the domestically produced
intermediates in this case. With respect to the welfare loss, the welfare cost of LCP in this case
is not so large as in the previous case because qm is lower (actually qm is equal to q
m in this case)
and the weighted sum of the marginal factor costs of intermediates q, is also lower than in Figure
1. The welfare cost of LCP under monopsony consists of the loss of the ﬁnal-goods producer only
(area 4DKLN). It should be noticed that the domestic intermediate-goods producers never gain nor
lose by the LCP, while the ﬁnal-goods producer necessarily gets worse o. Table 2 summarizes
the comparisons with respect to quantities and welfare costs among the three situations (free trade,
LCP under perfect competition, LCP under monopsony) in this special case.
5Free trade LCP under perfect competition LCP under monopsony
Q QFT QPC QK
M MFT MPC MFT
q q








Welfare cost       4IS FTG + 4DPCNDFT 4DKLDFT
Table 2: Comparison of variables and welfare cost in a special case
The possibility of this special case is slim. However, if we consider eects of a small change in
k from the free-trade level, it is considerable that LCP might not be eective to protect domestic
intermediate-goods producers. The analysis in this special case leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose the ﬁnal-goods producer behaves as a monopsonist in the market of do-
mestic intermediates. Then, the marginal expenditure cost of using a domestically produced in-
termediates has a discontinuous segment. A small increase in the rate of LCP from free-trade
level necessarily shrinks total use of intermediates by the ﬁnal-goods producer, but might neither
expand nor contract the production of domestic intermediates as long as the marginal expendi-
ture cost curve intersects the marginal value product curve of domestic intermediates within its
discontinuous segment.
3 Conclusions
This paper has shown how LCP aects the supply of the domestic intermediates, the use of to-
tal intermediates and the domestic welfare when domestic intermediate-goods market is under
monopsony. We draw two main conclusions from this analysis.
First, we have examined general resource allocation eects of LCP under domestic monop-
sony. And then we compared eects of LCP under monopsony with those under other cases (under
free trade, under perfect competition). Introducing LCP at the free-trade equilibrium increases the
use of the domestically produced intermediates and decreases the use of the total intermediates.
Comparing with the case under perfect competition, the degree of shrinkage in the ﬁnal-goods
industry is magniﬁed when the domestic intermediate-goods market is under monopsony. Fur-
thermore from the point of welfare, LCP has negative eects on the domestic welfare. In general,
LCPincreasestheamountofdomesticintermediates, henceraisesthedomesticintermediate-goods
producers’ payos. But the weighted sum of the marginal factor costs q gets higher, and domestic
ﬁnal-goods industry shrinks. The latter negative eect surpasses the former gain, thus the total
eect on domestic welfare is negative.
Second, we have obtained an interesting result in a special case. When the content rate is close
to the free trade level, the use of the domestic intermediates may not be expanded by LCP. This
possibility stems from the property of the marginal expenditure cost curve which has a discontin-
uous segment, and it occurs only in the case of domestic monopsony. As long as the marginal
expenditure cost intersects the value marginal product of domestic intermediates on its discontin-
uous segment, LCP has no eect on the use of the domestically produced intermediates. In this
case, LCP not only fails to expand the use of domestic intermediates, but also leads to the welfare
loss. The source of the welfare costs in this case is caused solely by the loss of the ﬁnal-goods
producer who is faced with a rise in the weighted sum of the marginal factor costs q.
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K: M =  kq(p;q;w)
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Figure 2: special case
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